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Throughout the past two decades there has been a resurgence of the 
concern with the rise of new great powers and its thematic cousin, 
American hegemony’s challenges and challengers (a resurgence that 
must be seen, of course, as relative to the static preoccupations of Cold 
War/bipolar International Relations theory). However, scholarly 
production has not been particularly enlightening. Not because the 
subject there considered is unimportant. On the contrary, rises and 
declines –be it of states, empires, civilizations, inter alia- and the 
potential to restructure world politics inherent to preeminent or hegemonic political units 
are powerful engines in international relations. This is why a critique of the epistemological, 
methodological and empirical aspects of this literature and a quest for more productive 
avenues of research is necessary. 
Neither a comprehensive critique of the literature nor a complete proposal for an 
alternative research project can be the goal of the present short essay. For the time being it 
will suffice to open some paths of discussion by way of putting forward certain challenges to 
this literature and sketching some notes (in a not un-Gramscian way) on alternative paths 
of research. 
By now the reader might reasonably be wondering what does Gramsci has to do with all 
this. Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, but also his ideas on war of position vs. war of 
movement and passive revolution could eventually be employed, I will argue, as one of the 
building-blocks of, as Gramsci would have expressed it himself, a counter-hegemonic 
narrative on the phenomenon of the rise and fall of great powers and international 
hegemony. (1) 
 
A note on the use of Gramsci: As with most of the work of the Italian Marxist, coming up 
with a circumscribed definition for these critical concepts and ideas is an arduous, and 
probably unfruitful exercise. The Prison Notebooks, (2) Gramsci’s magnum opus, is in itself 
just notes; ideas dispersed in short chapters that do not claim to be a coherent project (at 
least in the way we tend to think the argumentative organization of books). Thus Gramsci’s 
own work allows for a not rigidly structured use of his ideas (e.g. there is no need to follow 
him all the way down in his unorthodox Marxism). Even more, one of the central points of 
Gramscian thought centers around the notion of a pragmatic understanding of theory. In 
other words, the search for a “real theoretical truth” is not nearly as relevant as the search 
for a “useful truth”. With this spirit is that I approach the issues of hegemony and rise and 
fall with the Prison Notebooks behind the arm. 
*  *  *  *  *  * 
The most diffused argument on the rise and decline of the great powers (3) can be 
summarized,grosso modo –and avoiding existing differences between schools and 
theorists- as following: the international system, against what balance of power theorists 
would argue, tends to have a hegemonic power (Spain in the 16th centuries, Portugal in the 
17th century, the Netherlands in the second half of the 18th century, Great Britain in the 
19th and beginnings of the 20th century, and, from then on, the United States) that 
establishes a certain international order. But the system is not immutable, the difference in 
the rates of growth between states will generate competitors to the hegemon, which, if 
dissatisfied with the present order, will try to bring it down (4) -even if this entails the use 
of force (i.e. a hegemonic war, in the words of Raymond Aron). (5) 
 
Not surprisingly, and in some ways understandably, the literature has an obsession with 
transition periods and war. In social scientific terms then, the whole phenomenon of rising 
and declining ends up as the explanandum to explicate the explanans (i.e. transition and 
war). By doing this it obscures an array of phenomena that cannot be studied in a 
dichotomy of hegemon and challenger. Methodological and empirical issues (e.g. How do 
we measure power? Is economic rise a sufficient cause for a change in the system? How 
many cases are historically relevant? etc.) are part of the problem (more on these 
difficulties below). 
  
Moreover, this approach seems to be propelled by an anxiety generated by the prospect that 
there will be no huge transformations in the world. In the words of John Gray: “paranoia is 
a protest against unimportance.” (6) In Gramscian vocabulary: people need to think they 
are living in changing “epochal” times (especially academics that make a living out of 
“explaining and predicting” these “epochal changes”). The result has been an anxious 
expectation for the arrival of a challenger to the hegemon and the plausibility of a 
hegemonic conflict in the process of transition. First came the USSR from the 1950s to the 
1970s. When the Soviets proved to be a pathetic challenger, the time came for Japan, the 
“rising sun.” Japan’s challenge was dismissed before the end of the 20th century. However, 
this was not a cause of distress for students of power transitions, now they had China. 
As I have showed elsewhere, (7) serious contemplation cannot but conclude that there is 
little use for the kind of futurology contest that this literature has turned into. Of course, the 
central question then is: acknowledging that this is a topic that should be seriously studied, 
how can the discipline go forward? 
Diversifying the questions we have been asking is one way. For example, the problématique 
should be not so much what will happen when a state rises, or even which are the states 
currently rising, but why have so many states failed to rise -a necessary(!) counterpart to 
understand the deep reasons for “successful” rises. Working on the “rise of the West” in a 
comparative-civilizational line, Jack Goldstone comments on the tendency to uncritically 
accept a “winner” bias: “Because all too often, we view world history in terms of ‘winners’ 
and ‘losers,’ elevate to prominence much in the ‘winners’’ history, and obscure or lose sight 
of similar items in the history of retrospective ‘losers’.” (8) Until we have a good grasp of 
why the great-powers-that-could-have-been -or as I call it elsewhere, “failed rises”- (9) 
follow different trajectories from those considered “successful” rises (while sharing similar 
departure points) our understanding of rises, declines and hegemony will stay worryingly 
incomplete. 
On the other hand, increasing the complexity in the concept of hegemony (and thus, of 
power) promises to be a profitable enterprise. And here is where Gramsci enters the scene. 
The most convincing Gramscian in International Relations theory has defined the Italian’s 
concept of hegemony in the following way: 
“Antonio Gramsci used the concept of hegemony to express a unity between objective 
material forces and ethico-political ideas in Marxian terms, a unity of structure and 
superstructure- in which power based on dominance over production is rationalized 
through an ideology incorporating compromise or consensus between dominant and 
subordinate groups…. A hegemonial structure of world order is one in which power takes a 
primarily consensual form…”(10) 
 
One of Gramsci’s biggest challenges was how to devise the creation of a new hegemony in 
Western Europe –that is, an alternative to western capitalism/democracy. The classical 
methods of frontal and violent attack, essence of the Russian Revolution, or what Gramsci 
calls “war of movement,” were of no use in the West. While it was just a government that 
the Bolsheviks had to overthrow in order to install a new regime, the proto-Modern Princes 
(i.e. Communist Parties) in Western Europe would have to confront a much more robust 
complex represented in the formula “civil society plus state.” In this context a “war of 
position” would be the best option. The core of this notion is that, confronted to such a 
resilient organization, one must win the battle from within; create a new hegemony before 
taking power. According to Gramsci: “A social group can and indeed must, already ‘lead’ 
before winning governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions for the 
winning of such power)”(p. 47, Prison Notebooks). A simple power battle -a new October 
1917- was not enough. This is why Cox talks about a “consensual form” and the primacy of 
ideology. 
Going from mainstream IR “thin” to a “thicker” version of hegemony (using Geertzian 
concepts in a slightly unorthodox way) would problematize the issue of rises and declines in 
interesting ways. 
To begin with, the preeminent place currently occupied in the literature by rates of growth 
would seem laughable to Gramsci. (11) Both in the analysis/futurology of possible 
challengers to US hegemony and for the more general dynamics of rises and declines -see 
especially the libraries of (naïve?) scholarly and journalistic production on the so-called 
“BRICS”. Even if these trajectories of growth could be accurately predicted (a dubious 
assumption), inferring a new internationalhistoric bloc or a new great powers configuration 
would depend on a leap of faith. Extrapolating Gramsci’s historicism, it could be argued 
that an essentially material account of power might have been plausible during, let’s say, 
Habsburg preeminence in the 16th and part of the 17th centuries. This has not been the case 
for a long time. Just as Gramsci devised a qualitative change in European politics, in which 
civil-society/state and ideas/material-forces were inevitably intertwined, there is case to 
make that the present international order is too complex to be seenjust through ratios of 
economic growth and other material variables. (12) A counter-hegemon would need to do 
much more than surpass the US materially (however this is defined). But the point is also 
that the general phenomenon of the rise of great powers is likewise much more complex 
than devising future scenarios under the bewilderment generated by the BRIC’s growth 
rates.  
 
Several paths follow the critique of “thin” hegemony. One is to give a more relevant place to 
discourse, recognition and legitimacy. Achieving great power status or building a 
hegemonic order is in many ways a discursive affair. In the 19th century recognition as a 
great power might have been identified by, inter alia, studying who participated in the 
diplomatic arena as a legitimate great power –e.g. who was sitting as a peer at the table 
during the Congress of Vienna. This discursive dynamic is probably more complex 
nowadays –e.g. who is identified in the cover of the Economist as “rising”- but is still an 
essential element and it should be studied carefully.(13) In a word, achieving a certain 
status in world politics is not the automatic effect of material variations but the recognition 
by an Other(s) that a political unit has become part of a particular club or class because, 
among other things, such a variation in material capabilities has occurred. This mutual 
empowerment aspect could also be useful in explaining the aforementioned phenomenon of 
“failed rises” (the development of this idea, however, must be saved for another occasion).  
It should be clear that this is also a call to historicize the sources of power. Since, as 
Gramsci assumed, hegemony –but any order in general- changes its basic attributes and 
dynamics with time, likewise the variables that explain how agents interact with those 
structures should also change. Social scientists tend to be weak against the temptation to 
over-generalize; a Gramscian outlook could work as an antidote to the follies inherent in 
the excesses committed in the name of social scientific “laws.” 
Another interesting possibility lies in the elucidation of the resilience American hegemony 
seems to be presenting. Neorealism has been left in an uncomfortable place under the 
unwillingness of American preeminence to give place to a multipolar or bipolar world (since 
unipolarity is an anomaly for neorealist theory). A “thick” notion of hegemony would help 
explain this. Even if material change is continuously going on, “thick” hegemony, as 
explained before, does not depend exclusively on it. There is an ideological aspect that 
reinforces path dependence trajectories that might turn hegemony more resilient even 
when the US might be losing ground in terms of its material preeminence (this could be 
paired with neoliberalism’s focus on institutions as central to an hegemon and its order). 
Hegemonic path dependence does not mean that we have arrived to the “end of History and 
the last Hegemony”, to paraphrase an excessively well-known title. It is, however, an 
acknowledgment that change in international politics is a complex and multidimensional 
phenomenon. 
*  *  *  *  *  * 
It is certainly possible that one day –probably a long time from now- China will replace the 
US as the most powerful state, eventually –but not necessarily- building a new international 
order. It is also possible that the “BRICS” (or any other creation from the armies of 
acronym-chasers) will rise to great power status conforming a multipolar world. The 
problem is that it is also very possible that 30 years from now no one will remember the 
“rise of China” or the “rise of the BRICS.” These are unknowns we cannot escape. As with 
“Japan’s rise” in the 1980s, the infinite paper, ink, and time wasted could end up in the 
most embarrassing dustbin in the history of the discipline. This should not be interpreted 
as a call to stop studying these dynamics, but as an emphatic request to critically think 
about the best way(s) to do this. Though engaging in futurology is definitely the correct 
approach if the goal is selling books and being published in well-known journals, I argue 
that the best way to do this if the purpose is building knowledge is: a) increasing the 
complexity in the use of variables and concepts such as power, hegemony, rise and decline, 
etc. b) avoiding a “winner bias” and understanding the cases of “failed rises”, c) 
historicizing structural dynamics and properties and the sources that explain how agents 
interact with those structures, d) engaging with history in the search for clues on how to 
think about the present and not in an attempt to come up with historical “laws”, e) finally, 
and probably the most important, accepting the complex nature of profound change in 
international politics instead of escaping to the triteness of futurology that rather than 
educating fosters misunderstanding. 
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